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Chechen Reality: GRU vs. FSB
By ROUSTAM KALIYEV (CHIHARRO)(1) 
Chechnya has entered a new phase of confrontation. Even official Russian spokesmen 
have acknowledged that, since August, there has been an intensification of fighting in 
the republic. According to some accounts, every day five Russian soldiers are killed and 
an equal number wounded as a result of the various attacks carried out by Chechens. 
The office of Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the president's spokesman, and representatives of 
the General Staff who are charged officially with informing the public about the progress 
of the war, prefer not to comment on Russian losses, and in fact have not done so since 
last year.
THE 'COUNTER-TERRORISM' OPERATION
Punitive operations against the civilian population, which were used during the last war 
as a "preventative" measure against the possibility of attack, have turned out to be 
ineffective in the present campaign. This works poorly because, unlike the methods of 
the first war, the present practice employs "preventative" measures -- such as 
"cleansings" -- in an indiscriminate manner, regardless of whether or not there is a 
threat from the Chechen combatants.
"It makes no difference if there are Chechen fighters in a village. The armed forces 
organize provocations to carry out 'cleansings,'" say many Chechens. (2)
Residents of the village Alkhan-Kala, the home of the infamous hostage taker and 
slavetrader Arbi Baraev, say that cleansings were limited to those parts of the village 
which did not house Baraev or his men. Even after Baraev was killed last June, his 
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associates continued to live openly in the village. Alkhan-Kala counted 86 "cleansings" 
in their village during the year 2000, an average of 1.5 times a week. (3)
Chechens insist that those areas which are most supportive of Russian authorities are 
subjected to the most looting and other abuses by the armed forces. "They stimulate 
opposition from the young people. The village of Gekhi must be the place in Chechnya 
most loyal to Russia," says a resident of that village, "but even here the armed forces 
find excuses to arrest all the young people. They even take away MVD cadres!" In fact 
one Gekhi native, Beslan Gantemirov, has been appointed federal inspector 
subordinate to General Viktor Kazantsev, the presidential representative to the southern 
district.
WHO IS FIGHTING WHOM IN CHECHNYA?
This war is witnessing the unfolding of a new reality, in which the lines are not drawn 
simply between Russians and Chechens but among competing Russian security 
services. This does not constitute competition among Russian power structures: It is 
better described as a war the objectives of which include political influence and control 
over the funds allocated to rebuild the looted republic.
In 1999, Boris Yel'tsin found a way out of the Chechen crisis (or perhaps was nudged in 
that direction by his "power ministers") by assigning responsibility for that problem to an 
FSB officer, Vladimir Putin. This decision brought the confrontation of two sworn 
enemies, the FSB and military intelligence (GRU), to a qualitatively new level. 
Historically, little is known about the competition between Russian security services, 
especially between FSB and GRU.(4) Chechnya, which exists completely outside the 
legal sphere and is rarely observed by outsiders, including the president, constitutes the 
arena in which these giants wrestle. At the same time their goals and interests are far 
from Chechnya and have little do with resolving the Chechen crisis. The FSB and GRU 
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represent two influential parties with different corporate interests vis-a-vis military, 
political and geopolitical concerns.
During Soviet times, military intelligence remained under the General Staff and was 
independent of the KGB. Its strategists were concerned with global affairs. GRU is one 
of the few Russian agencies that was almost unaffected by Gorbachev's and Yel'tsin's 
reform periods. Yel'tsin excelled at counterbalancing different interests within his 
administration and shuffled cadres among the FSB and GRU on a few occasions. 
Nevertheless, GRU survived as a militarized, secretive agency with political ambitions 
and an ideology of Soviet-style derzhavnost. 
The FSB is seen as representing the KGB, including the interests of the other successor 
agencies which emerged from the KGB: The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), FAPSI, 
and the Federal Guards Service being chief among them. The FSB, as the heir of the 
KGB, also inherited the old rivalry with the Main Investigative Directorate (GRU) of the 
General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. Crafting a peace between these two agencies 
hardly is a realistic option. From Putin's perspective it may not even be desirable; he 
can stand back and let the generals compete for his favor. 
In January 2001 Putin transferred all official authority for maintaining order and 
overseeing the military operation in Chechnya from the Ministry of Defense to the FSB. 
Yet, he left the military operations themselves and the special operations under the 
control of the defense ministry. The administration of Chechnya is managed by a former 
associate of Maskhadov, the runaway mufti Akhmad Kadyrov, who, due to his purely 
nominal significance, doesn't annoy anyone in the presidential administration. Kadyrov 
is often said to be close to the "party of war" (within the defense ministry, particularly the 
head of the General Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin) which competes with the FSB in 
Chechnya. But it would be wrong to see Kadyrov as belonging exclusively to any one 
power ministry: There must be half a dozen cooks in his kitchen.
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PUTIN'S QUANDARY
GRU and the General Staff became particularly active with the start of the war. The 
General Staff was the tail trying to wag the dog -- the defense ministry, the Defense 
Council, and the Security Council. While some elements in the military, including 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, were reluctant to launch an all-out war in Chechnya, 
Chief of General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, his deputy Valery Manilov, and the 
commanding officers in the North Caucasus were pushing vigorously for a ground 
offensive. In November 1999, Kvashnin threatened to resign and Major General Valery 
Shamanov, commander of the Western Group of Forces in Chechnya, threatened a 
mutiny if they did not get a free hand in Chechnya. (5) 
In 1999, using the crisis and then the war in Chechnya, the security services 
accomplished a velvet revolution. At that stage, while they were strengthening their 
positions in President Yel'tsin's administration, the interests of the various security 
services coincided. This view accords with the theory, which has been put forward 
repeatedly in many Novaya gazeta articles and was most extensively documented in 
the recent special issue "FSB Blows Up Russia," that the explosions in Moscow and 
other Russian cities which triggered the war were the joint work of the KGB and GRU.
(6) 
After achieving the common goal of securing the top government position for one of 
their own, old rivalries and corporate interests again came to the forefront. Following the 
March 2000 presidential elections, the various agencies reverted to the old pattern of 
trying to prove themselves indispensable to the newly minted president. It is an old 
routine that the main vehicle for doing so is by hatching provocations against others; 
fighting corruption or banditism is a rather secondary way of showing off an agency's 
mettle.
Putin, of course, is no amateur at this game and understands its dynamics perfectly. 
Having made his choice, he delivered his first blow against GRU by making Sergei 
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Ivanov defense minister. Placing a career SVR man at the helm of the defense ministry 
put the brakes on the General Staff and its subordinate structures, including GRU.
The next step in Putin's "reform" of the security structures most likely will be a long-
awaited merger of several large power ministries. The structures that would lose their 
independent standing would be GRU, the Federal Guards Service, the Federal Courier 
Service and FAPSI, which would be submerged under an expanded SVR. Some steps 
in this direction already have been taken. For instance out of the 12 deputy directors of 
GRU, 6 have been replaced by generals from the SVR. (7) The other agencies 
mentioned above have experienced similar cadre changes. It would seem, however, 
that Putin does not wish to rely exclusively on the FSB, and is preparing for it a "worthy" 
competitor.
It is difficult to predict how such changes would affect Chechnya or the North Caucasus 
as a whole. The war they stoked in Chechnya served the FSB and GRU well; it gave 
them ample opportunity to prove themselves and to try to undermine each other. 
Extremist factions and the Chechen partisans, despite all their seeming uncontrollability, 
play only supporting roles in what is a titanic struggle. Absorbed with their intrigues, the 
security services did not notice that the monster they created, which gives a specific 
shape to vague fears of international extremism, was slipping beyond their control. 
While it is not reasonable to assert, as some have, that the terrorist acts in the US 
activated extremist circles in hot spots worldwide, including Chechnya, a more modest 
assessment can be made. The terrorists have set a new precedent, and in so doing 
expanded the limits of terror's possibilities. 
Russian authorities are trying to extract maximum political advantage from the hideous 
blow that the US has suffered. Although Russian officials like to portray the war in 
Chechnya as a counter-terrorist operation that targets ringleaders of rebel groups, this 
image is far from reality. Rather than combat predatory Chechen militias, such as 
Baraev's, Russian forces terrorize the population. (Similarly, Russian official spokesmen 
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are hinting that the Chechens, whom they brand terrorists, share the responsibility for 
the attack on US cities.) 
The terrorist attack on US cities and the effort to launch an operation against terrorism 
will continue to draw the attention (not only of the international community and the press 
but also of the Chechens themselves) away from the human rights abuses proliferating 
in Chechnya. In light of this tendency and of the continued chaos in Chechnya, a 
substantial further deterioration in the conditions of the Chechen civilian population 
should be expected.
Notes:
1 Roustam Kaliyev, who sometimes publishes under the name Chiharro, has 
contributed articles about Chechnya to Moskovskiye novosti and Obshchaya gazeta. 
The most recent of his many trips to Chechnya was in October 2001. 
2 A specific instance where a Russian soldier was ordered to shoot at his own 
checkpoint to justify a cleansing was described in Vyacheslav Izmailov, "The latest 
weaponry in Chechnya: Naked Soldiers," Novaya gazeta, 9 August 2001. Also see Anne 
Nivat's, Chienne De Guerre: A Woman Reporter Behind the Lines of the War in 
Chechnya (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), which describes many instances where 
Russian forces avoid engaging the Chechen resistance. See, for example, Nivat's 
eyewitness account of the arrival of Chechen fighters from the fallen Grozny into the 
village Alkhan-Kala and the subsequent cleansing of the village, which began only after 
the fighters had gone. (pp. 193-215)
3 Arbi Baraev, a notorious hostage taker responsible for the beheadings of British and 
New Zealander telecommunications workers in 1998 (among many other high-profile 
kidnappings and killings), was not on the FSB's wanted list in the summer of 2000. 
Baraev and other hostage takers, such as the brothers Akhmadov, were living at home 
and using FSB identification to cross Russian roadblocks. The story of FSB protection 
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been the FSB chief for the Urus Martan region. Among other unsavory activities, 
Magomadov facilitated Baraev's trip to Moscow on the eve of the second Chechen war. 
Unus' brother, Adlan, is still Akhmad Kadyrov's representative to the Russian president. 
See Sanobar Shermatova, "Front page: Secret war of the Security Services," 
Moskovskiye novosti, 8 August 2000; Sanobar Shermatova and Leonid Nikitsky, 
"Generals of slave-trade," Moskovskiye novosti, 28 March 2000; and Vyacheslav 
Izmailov, "SpetzProtection for the Terrorists" Novaya gazeta, 17 September 2001. 
4 Some of the clearest indications of ongoing competition among FSB, MVD, and GRU 
are readily seen in Aleksandr Litvinenko and Yuri Fel'shtinsky, "FSB Blows Up Russia," 
Novaya gazeta, 27 August 2001, which describes those agencies' patronage of criminal 
structures. These activities amount to an undeclared war among the security services 
utilizing the criminal elements in their employ. 
5 Alexander Khinstein, "A Riot in the General Staff," Moskovsky komsomolets, 5 
November 1999, and Yevgeny Krutikov, "War in the Corridors of Power, Izvestia, 6 
November 1999. 
6 Litvinenko and Fel'shtinsky, op. cit. See also The Independent, 6 January 2000, which 
quoted GRU officer Alexei Galtin as saying: "It is the FSB (Russian Security Service), in 
cooperation with the GRU, that is responsible for the explosions in Volgodonsk and 
Moscow." In addition, Shamil Basaev, who spearheaded the August 1999 incursions into 
Dagestan, the other trigger of the war, is widely rumored to have been a GRU officer in 
the early 1990s. Basaev never has denied those rumors. 
7 Stanislav Lekatev, "SVR swallows up GRU," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 August 2001.
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